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FROM BARE LIVES TO POLITICAL AGENTS:
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AS AVANT-GARDE
Ruba Salih*
Refugees and displaced have been, by and large, absent from recent analyses of the
Arab uprisings, unless as accidental victims and consequences of violence. Analyses
and debates on the reconfiguration of rights, democracy, social justice and dignity in
the region suffer from a chronic methodological nationalism, which perpetuates the
idea that people seek and fight for rights and self-determination solely in their
national territory, seen as the natural context for achieving a full social personhood.
The implication is that those who are at the margins of nation-states or who are
displaced from their own original nations/territories, like Palestinian refugees, come
to be twice marginalised and their predicament is made even more invisible. The
idea of return as their only life project does not give justice to the complexity of their
aspirations and claims that comprise the right to have rights, alongside the right to
return to their lost land and properties, which could be conceived, more broadly, as
a return to dignity. The implications are extremely significant and point to the need
to rethink nationalism and the classic modern project of the nation-state as the only
site for self-determination. Refugees’ narratives and practices call for a critical exam-
ination of the classic notion that access to rights should be dependent upon belonging
to territorially bound and homogenous national communities, a notion that is flawed
to start with in most Middle Eastern nation-states, where structures and opportunities
for power, rights, and resources reflect and reinforce complex hierarchies based on
ethnic, religious, gender, and class divisions.
Keywords: Palestinian refugees, rights, return, dignity
Those few refugees who insist upon telling the truth, even to the point of
‘indecency’, get in exchange for their unpopularity one priceless advantage:
history is no longer a closed book to them and politics is no longer the
privilege of Gentiles.1
The novelty of our era, which threatens the very foundations of the
nation-state, is that growing portions of humanity can no longer be repre-
sented within it. For this reason – that is, in as much as the refugee unhinges
* Reader in Gender Studies & Chair of the Centre for Gender Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London.
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the old trinity of state/nation/territory – this apparently marginal figure
deserves rather to be considered the central figure of our political history.2
1. Introduction3
My name is Jamila. I want this message to reach all. It is about the right of
the original refugees. These people are paying the price for their national
cause. Their houses are not healthy and nobody takes care of them, neither
the State nor UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency]. Any
type of care is denied to us. Why did they abandon us? Where are the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] and all these people who visited us?
Where are the rich Palestinians who go around talking about the
Palestinian cause? And where is the haqq [right] of the poorest
Palestinian people and the first generation who had the burden of carrying
the Palestinian question? They come and take pictures of us and then say:
‘we are happy with/like them and then we leave them and forget about
them’. I want the message to reach the rich. And these poor old people who
get themselves tired, who are old and dying here and they are asking ‘we
want to go back ‘they are those who carry for you the qadiya [cause] and
ism watanak [the name of your nation]. And you do nothing. Your power
and your abilities get them out to reach those who need them.4
In Homo Sacer, political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, drawing from the in-
fluential work of Hannah Arendt, argued that the figure of the refugee represents
one of the most potent and dramatic embodiments of the constitutive fallacies of
the modern nation-states. The refugee symbolises the bare life that lies beneath
the citizen and that constitutes its foundation, and yet is excluded from rights
and sovereignty and confined to a zone of indistinction or dependence on
humanitarianism.
Human rights have had a specific historical function in the formation of the
modern nation-state. The declaration of human rights represented the inscrip-
tion of the natural life in the political juridical order of the modern nation-state.
It is the fact of being born, the mere fact of being a human being, which confers
in principle membership into the political community. The human being melts
in the citizen figure where rights are conserved. Sovereignty is then transferred
onto the nation. As Agamben puts it, the fiction lies in the idea that by virtue of
2 G. Agamben, We Refugees, Symposium, 49(2), Summer 1995, Michael Rocke (trans.), 1995, 117.
3 The paper presents the preliminary results of a research project conducted together with Dr Sophie
Richter-Devroe (Exeter) about Palestinian refugees’ political cultures on return and “rights” in three different
locations of exile, Jordan, the West Bank, and Lebanon. The research, which involved interviews and par-
ticipant observation with over a hundred refugees, (in and outside refugee camps) has been conducted
through several research fieldworks between 2009 and 2012. This research was made possible thanks to
the generous support of the Council for British Research in the Levant. I would like to thank Ilan Pappe’ and
Rosemary Sayigh for reading drafts of this chapter and providing crucial insights.
4 Jamila, Gaza camp, Jordan, Jun. 2011.
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being born, a subject is a holder of rights, which are attributed to the man, or
derive from him. However, how to identify who is a citizen and who is not has
constituted the essential political question of the modern nation-state. Indeed,
already in the early 1900, many European nation-states started to enact policies
of mass denationalisation or de-naturalisation of their citizens. France in 1915
denaturalised those subjects who originated from enemy countries. In 1926, the
Italian fascist regime made a law denationalising those who were considered to
have committed anti-Italian acts. Nazi Germany and the Third Reich took this
principle to its extreme, with the notion of the protection of the German blood
and honour, dividing German citizens into first and second-class citizens and
introducing the idea of citizenship as something to be deserved rather than to be
granted upon birth.5 Later, through racism and eugenetics, Nazi Germany will
effectively differentiate between an authentic life and a bare life, which has no
political value. As Agamben remarks:
One of the few rules the Nazis faithfully observed in the course of the ‘final
solution’ was that only after the Jews and gypsies were completely denatio-
nalized (even of that second-class citizenship that belonged to them after the
Nuremberg laws) could they be sent to the extermination camps. When the
rights of man are no longer the rights of the citizen, then he is truly sacred,
in the sense that this term had in archaic Roman law: destined to die.6
Between the First and the Second World Wars the refugee dramatically started to
embody the constitutive contradictions of the modern nation-state. The droits de
l’homme, which were the basis upon which citizenship rights were conferred, begin
to be divorced from the latter and started to be used outside the context of
sovereignty with the aim of protecting a bare life which comes to be expelled
from, or located at the margins, of the nation-states and managed by human rights
agencies. A plethora of humanitarian constructions perpetuated the separation.7
Agamben’s analysis is of striking importance to unfold some of the less
explored strands of Palestinian refugeehood.8 Indeed, once refugee camps ceased
to be active sites of national struggle and resistance, it may seem that all is left is a
humanitarian management that ultimately separates Palestinian refugees from
5 G. Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la vita nuda, Turin, Giulio Einaudi, 1995.
6 Agamben, We Refugees, 117.
7 An insightful analysis of the ways in which human rights discourse is mobilised in occupied Palestine is L.
Allen, “Martyr’s Bodies in the Media. Human Rights, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Immediation in the
Palestinian Intifada”, American Ethnologist, 36(1), 2009, 161–180.
8 The Palestinian refugee question has been studied at length. Amongst the many publications see the essays in
J. Ginat & E. Perkins (eds.), The Palestinian Refugees. Old Problems-New Solutions, Brighton, Sussex Academic
Press, 2001; the excellent collection B. Riccardo, B. Destremau & J. Hannoyer (eds.), Palestine, Palestiniens.
Territoire national, espaces communitaires, Amman, Cermoc, 1997; N. Aruri, Palestinian Refugees. The Right of
Return, London, Pluto Press, 2011; L. Takkemberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998. Among the socio-anthropological studies: J. Peteet, Landscape of Hope and
Despair. Palestinian Refugee Camps, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005; L. Khalili, Heroes
and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2007. See also D. Chatty & G.L. Hundt (eds.), Children of Palestine. Experiencing Forced Migration in the
Middle East, Oxford, Bergaham Books, 2005.
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the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship, contributing to reproduce the
camps as biopolitical paradigms of the space of exception.9 The “permanent
temporariness” that characterises refugees’ lives is a powerful reminder of
Agamben’s zone of indistinction. Palestinian refugees’ status could be seen, at
best, that of temporary citizens (Jordan) and, at worst, that of stateless subjects
(Lebanon).10 In Jordan, Palestinians have been at times the assimilated – docile –
nationals, at times the “other” against which contingent and precarious national
identities were historically fabricated. In Lebanon, for many years throughout
the civil war and until 1989 the Tai’f agreements that put an end to the civil war,
they have been central actors in drawing the past and contemporary political
configuration of the country, paying a very high price in terms of marginality,
death, and finally abandonment.11
However, this is only a partial picture. I suggest that Palestinian refugees
articulate powerful critiques from below, which make them, in Hannah Arendt’s
terms, the potential “vanguard of their people”.12 Partha Chatterjee coined the
notion “political society” to denote those new aspirations and claims that in
many postcolonial contexts emerged outside, and somehow in opposition to, the
earlier liberal consensus of state-civil society relations.
[. . .] the historical task that has been set by these movements is to work out
new forms of democratic institutions and practices in the mediating field of
political society that lies between civil society and the nation-state.13
While their idioms are still nationalist, these movements may encompass
sub, post, and transnational allegiances, aspirations, claims, and solidarities.
Attempting to take seriously Appadurai’s urge to rethink the linguistic imaginary
of the nation-state, Partha Chatterjee argues that these projects are located in an
interstice between civil society and the nation-state which they may contest.
Moreover, these agencies are interested in a project of democracy rather than
in one of modernity or modernisation, from which they were excluded or only
partially included.
Taking Palestinian refugees’ narratives to their full depth, one could suggest
that they are forming a “political society”, composed of new claims, narratives,
9 See S. Hanafi, “Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon as a Space of Exception”, Revue Asylon(s), 5, Sep.
2008; M. Kortam, “Politics, Patronage and Popular Committees in the Shatila Refugee Camp, Lebanon”, in
A. Knudsen & S. Hanafi (eds.), Palestinian refugees. Identity, Space and Place in the Levant, London,
Routledge, 2011, 193–205.
10 On statelessness among the Palestinian refugees: A. Shiblak, “Passport for What Price? Statelessness among
Palestinian Refugees”, in A. Knudsen & S. Hanafi (eds.), Palestinian Refugees. Identity, Space and Place in the
Levant, London, Routledge, 2011, 113–128.
11 Crucial studies on the life of Palestinians in Lebanon and various aspects of their political history are: R.
Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: the Palestinian Experience in Lebanon, London, Zed Books 1994; R. Sayigh,
“Palestinians in Lebanon: (Dis)Solution of the Refugee Problem“, Race and Class, 37, 1995, 27–42; R.
Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, London, Zed Press, 2007 (1979).
12 H. Arendt, “We Refugees”, in M. Robinson (ed.), Altogether Elsewhere. Writers in Exile, Boston/London,
Faber and Faber, 1994, 111–119.
13 P. Chatterjee, “Beyond the Nation? Or Within?”, Social Text, 56, Autumn 1998, 57–69.
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and political practices, which they base on a different moral ground than that of
nationalism and the nation-state. Indeed, having been left out of the post-Oslo
consensus of the two-state solution, refugees are urged to make new sense of their
64 years of dispossession and exile.14 In the current predicament, nationalist
narratives sound like mere rhetoric that perpetuate producing refugees as pawns
and instruments, but depriving them of any real perspective of justice and
agency. The starting point is refugees’ bitter disillusion with the official narrative
that their lack of rights was the pre-condition for return. Third or even fourth
generations of Palestinian refugees in most cases still do not have basic rights and
their return has never been as jeopardised and distant as it is today.
In many senses, this research builds on Rosemary Sayigh and Julie Peteet’s
influential works on refugee camps in Lebanon.15 It takes the work further in
two directions, a geographical and a temporal one. First it interrogates what it
means for refugees to think of return and self-determination at a time of a crisis
of the national project. Secondly, it tries to show, through a comparison between
Jordan and Lebanon, how refugees’ subjugation to specific and diverse forms of
control and exception remains sadly at stake even when they became refugee-
citizens of the host country in which they sought refuge.
Notwithstanding the persistent manoeuvre to reduce them to bare life, in
their daily existence, refugees question their status as a mass of indistinct ben-
eficiaries, as stateless subjects or as temporary citizens. Significantly, they defy the
opposition between return and rights, which they do not see as mutually exclu-
sive political projects. This process can be mostly observed in the ways in which
Palestinian refugees’ identity is retained simultaneously with practices of em-
placement. In refugees’ narratives and life strategies, displacement and emplace-
ment are simultaneous projects and life strategies defying the “national order of
things”.16 Refugees’ imaginaries of return seem to substantiate this point. As well
14 Laleh Khalili conducted an interesting study, which looks at Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as agents,
through mnemonic and commemorative practices of the rural, local, pre-exilic life as opposed to the
nationalist commemorations. The former are interpreted as critical narratives towards the national leadership
and elites. See L. Khalili, “Grass-roots Commemorations. Remembering the Land in the Camps of
Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 34(1), Autumn 2004, 6–22.
15 Rosemary Sayigh argued in a recent article that Palestinians in Lebanon are developing a camp local/national
“group identity” which gives birth to a latent “oppositional consciousness” towards nationalist leaderships
and institutions. See R. Sayigh, “Palestinian Camp Refugee Identifications. A New Look at the Local and the
National”, in A. Knudsen & S. Hanafi (eds.), Palestinian Refugees. Identity, Space and Place in the Levant,
London, Routledge, 2011, 50–64. Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair. This study also tries to unfold
some major questions that have been addressed by Sari Hanafi in his many publications on the topic. Sari
Hanafi rightly argues that Agamben fails to account for the agency of the refugees and shows how the camp is
in fact regulated by a multiplicity of actors and semi or phantom sovereigns: United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), local and international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), local committees amongst others. S. Hanafi, “Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Palestinian
Territory: Territory of Exception and Locus of Resistance”, in A. Ophir, M. Givoni & S. Hanafi (eds.),
The Power of Inclusive Exclusion; Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, New York,
Zone books, 2009, 495–519.
16 For an analysis of the construction of categories of refugees, emplacement and displacement see: L. Malkii,
Purity and Exile. Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1995; and L.Malkii, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the
National Order of Things”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 24(1), 1995, 495–523.
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as a right to go back to one’s properties and land, return is associated with tropes
that recall pre-national and post-national meanings on self-determination. Most
notably, return is seen as return to dignity, freedom, personhood where the latter
is signified by being ahl el ard, the original land owners and inhabitants, a notion
that is crucial in informing people’s individual and collective identities and
status.
In this and other senses, refugees’ narratives call for a critical examination of
the classic notion that access to rights should be dependent upon belonging to
territorially bound and homogenous national communities, a notion that is as
flawed to start with in most Middle Eastern nation-states, where ethnic, reli-
gious, gender, and class divisions have created complex hierarchical structures
and opportunities for power, rights, and resources.17
2. Precarious citizens, stateless subjects: Palestinians and exception
in Jordan and Lebanon
2.1. Jordan: Palestinians as diuf / guests
Jamila’s bitter words at the outset of the paper are a lucid and powerful example
of camp refugees’ types of claims and aspirations, where the centrality of their
endurances and suffering for the Palestine question are vindicated and uttered.
Jamila, it appears clearly, makes her statements from a precise standpoint, that of
the stateless and disenfranchised dwellers of the Gaza Camp, and is directed to
Palestinian elites and leadership, as well as to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and
the Jordanian State. Jamila echoes the sentiments and dispositions of many other
Palestinian refugees in both Lebanon and Jordan who, in addition to being the
historical victims of Israeli ethnic cleansing,18 are the archetypes of disenfran-
chised subjects fighting against exclusionary nation-states, where rights and en-
titlements are highly layered and hierarchically distributed according to ethnicity,
religious affiliation, nationality, class, gender, and family status.
For over 60 years, Palestinians have been unable to return to their original
lands and/or to obtain any compensation for their material and human losses.
Indeed, Israel has adamantly refused to be considered accountable for the tragedy
of the Nakba and had only been ready to accommodate, in historical Palestine, a
symbolic number of first generation refugees. Simultaneously, many host
countries have endorsed the idea that naturalisation and access to full rights
(tawtin) and even tatwir (development) would constitute a de facto assimilation
of the refugee populations and would, eventually, undermine their right of
return.19
17 S. Joseph (ed.), Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2000.
18 I. Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publishers, 2006.
19 See the essays collected in A. Knudsen & S. Hanafi (eds.), Palestinian Refugees. Identity, Space and Place in the
Levant, London, Routledge, 2011.
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However, as refugees themselves underline, in Lebanon and Jordan
‘Palestinianness’ has decisively shaped (and has been shaped by) nation-building
processes and projects. In Jordan – a country with a large majority of Palestinians
– what it means to be (or not) a Jordanian is inextricably linked with the selective
incorporation and exclusion of Palestinians in the country’s economic, political,
and socio-cultural structures. After 1948, following the Nakba, (the catastrophe)
a high portion of the ca. 900,000 Palestinian refugees sought shelter in Jordan
and subsequently, during the Naksa following the 1967 occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza, another high number of Palestinians were forced to flee and
sought refuge in Jordan.20 Significantly, most of these refugees were fleeing from
refugee camps like Ariha (Jericho) or Balata (Nablus) that had become their
homes after the 1948 expulsion. Aside from the class of Palestinian merchants
who lived, since Ottoman times, in the territory denominated by the British as
Transjordan, and who were immediately co-opted when the territory was given
the status of independent nation-state by the British, most Palestinians were
granted citizenship after the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan in 1950.
In fact there are now many categories of Palestinians residing in Jordan, with
various degrees of access to, or lack thereof, to civil rights and resources, ranging
from those who hold a two or a five years valid passport, those with or without
a national number (rakam watani), those with a green or a yellow travel card,
according to whether they reside in the West or the East side of the Jordan river,
respectively, and those with no documents whatsoever, like the so-called Gazawi.
The latter’s “fault” was to have sought refuge in the Egypt administered Gaza
strip in 1948. By virtue of this, they were not given Jordanian nationality in the
1950s and following the occupation of the Gaza strip by Israel in 1967, those
displaced in Jordan were granted a temporary residence of two years, and have
since then been considered as foreigners with no access to rights in the
Hashemite Kingdom.21 In fact, these seemingly administrative categorisations,
not only carry the complex political history of Ottoman and colonial projects,
but were re-signified with new contradictory meanings in post-colonial and
nationalist times, and have been implicated in structures of power that im-
prisoned people’s futures for generations.
Since the 1988 disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank
(fakk-el-irtibat) Palestinians with Jordanian nationality residing in the West
Bank cross the bridge with a green card, a colour that constructs them as citizens
20 Studies of Palestinian refugees in Jordan include: A. Abu Odeh, Jordanian, Palestinians and the Hashemite
Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, Washington DC, Institute of Peace Press, 1999; L. Brand,
“Palestinian and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 34(4), Summer 1995; R.
Farah. “Palestinian Refugee Camps Re-inscribing and Contesting Memory and Space”, in C. Strange & A.
Bashford (eds.), Isolation Places and Practices of Exclusion, New York/London Routledge, 2003, 191–208.
21 Gazans are considered and treated as foreigners in Jordan. For a full documentation of the categorisations of
Palestinians in Jordan and elsewhere see O. El-Abed, Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, undated, available at:
http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/palestinian-refugees-in-jordan/fmo025.pdf
(last visited 1 Jan. 2013).
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of a fictional Palestinian sovereign State, and by virtue of which Jordan justifies
its arbitrary withdrawal of their citizenship.22 We heard numerous accounts of
refugees who were confiscated their rakam watani, and who were given no clear
or convincing explanation, except that they are Palestinian nationals [sic.].
According to a report compiled by Human Right Watch, between 2004 and
2007, over 2700 Palestinians have seen their nationality withdrawn and more
than 200,000 Palestinians who fled Kuwait in 1990–1991 can be subjected to
the same treatment.23 Umm Maher, who raised seven children in the Hittin
camp suggested: “If you ask them [her children] for the balad asliya [the original
place, country], they would all say Palestine, but if you ask them for the jinsiya
[citizenship] they would say ‘Jordanian’”. She also added: “I lost my hawiyya
[Palestinian card], so I should at least take care of my raqam watani [Jordanian
national number].” Taking care of the rakam watani for Umm Mather, as well as
for many Palestinian refugees, means avoiding any act or indulging in behaviours
that can lead the tafteesh (the Inspection office) to withdraw it from her.
This exercise of exception is justified through the rhetoric of tawtin, (nat-
uralisation) and the need to prevent Israel from emptying the West Bank of its
Palestinian residents, (as well as by reference to the Arab League veto for dual
nationality for Arab nationals). In real terms, the effect of these hierarchies and
categorisations is the construction and naturalisation of differences between
Palestinian “nationals”, and Jordanian “nationals”, a category that includes
some assimilated Palestinians, who are represented as legitimate members
of the sovereign Hashemite Kingdom. These discourses tend to crystallise the
identities of the holders into various degrees of Jordanianness or Palestinianness,
seen as mutually exclusive entities, in contrast with the much more fluid and
complex ways in which people themselves experienced historically these identi-
ties. As Abu Ghassan, a former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) cadre
who was jailed in Jordan after Black September, suggested: “[. . .] it was not like
that before the 1970s [. . .] These differences between Jordanians and Palestinians
did not exist like today before harb Ajlul [Black September . . .] it is all very
recent.” Umm Ghazi, who lives in Asharfyeeh, a Palestinian neighbourhood close
to the Wihdat refugee camp, and whose father joined the Army soon after the
family was displaced to Jordan from their Gerico refugee camp in 1967, remem-
bered with sadness how during Black September the fight was very often between
Palestinian guerrillas and Palestinians who were in the Jordanian army. Indeed, a
distinct Jordanian national identity was fabricated and institutionalised consist-
ently after Black September, when the Jordanian army smashed the Palestinian
resistance in Jordan and following on that, in the early 1970s, a process of
22 Palestinians permanently residing in the East Bank have been given a yellow card, to differentiate them from
those who reside in the West Bank under the PA, who are now seen as Palestinian nationals and in that
respect not entitled to hold a Jordanian nationality, while Palestinians residing permanently in the East Bank
and those who came before 1948 are naturalised Jordanians.
23 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality,
Report, New York, HRW, 2010, available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/87906 (last visited 1 Jan. 2013).
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Jordanisation of the public sector and the bureaucracy started to be wholesale
applied.
According to Joseph Massad, the aftermath of Black September constituted:
[. . .] the country’s moment of implosion, which proved crucial for national
redefinition. Much of the country’s elite, including the Palestinian-
Jordanian elite, backed the regime. The guerrillas were defeated and a
major campaign of Jordanization, which had already been in existence
before the Civil War, went into full swing after it. The other of the
Jordanian was no longer the external British colonialist but an internal
other, namely, Palestinian Jordanians.24
The modern national configuration, which naturalises Palestinians and
Jordanians into different peoples, is subject to intense scrutiny and is often
contested by refugees. In expressing his view on intermarriages between
Jordanians and Palestinians, Osama, a young volunteer and dweller of the
Talbyieh camp whose family is originally from Beir Sab’a, offered a lucid and
poignant reflection on the material and symbolic issues supporting the hierar-
chies between Jordanians and Palestinians. Here the specific location of Talbyieh,
an agricultural area, significantly marked the nature of refugees’ relations with
the local populations, composed of Bedouin families and tribal landowners who
hired Palestinians as land workers in the early stages of their arrival.
There is not much intermarriage between people from the mukhayyam and
Jordanians. Us and them, we both don’t want. They consider us from lower
class, and I don’t want to give my girl to someone who thinks that way
about us. It is not us who are doing the differentiation, it is them. They are
saying “we are Jordanian” [. . .] but we all know that the division between
Jordan and Palestine is ardi, it is a territorial division. The families of the
south of Palestine were the same families. If we are the same family, why do
you consider yourself as something better? In the 50’s Palestinians were
working as peasants on Jordanian land, [for Jordanian landowners . . .] it
is not right to say that someone is superior just because he is the owner of
land [malik al-ard] [. . .] later, because we did not have any land, education
became our way to invest. Our children have to be educated, to make an
investment. Now we have the highest level of education as Palestinians. If
you look at the newspaper, in the upper part of the best students, you see
Palestinian names and Jordanian names appear only later.
Jordanianness and Palestinianness became, over time, national identifications
with specific, albeit diverse, meanings to people. The drama of displacement
and the expulsion and oppression that Palestinians faced as an unwanted nation,
together with the birth of the resistance movement, all contributed to reinforce a
24 J. Massad, Colonial Effects. The Making of National Identity in Jordan, New York, Columbia University Press,
2001, 10.
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distinct Palestinian national identity.25 However, there is awareness and contest-
ation over the ways in which these identities have been naturalised and are
strategically called upon to reinforce hierarchies and legitimise exclusion and
discrimination. Abu Ahmad, a shopkeeper we interviewed in the Hittin camp,
provided us with a very compelling and symbolic example about the ways in
which Jordanians differentiated the Palestinians to exclude them from the Army:
“When they recruited for the army, they showed an onion to them and asked
them to say what it was. Those who said basala were Palestinians and did not get
into the army, those who said ibsala were Jordanian Bedouins, those they took
into the army.” The story, which may be one of the many oral legends, is
nonetheless strikingly evocative of how Palestinians de-sacralise these discursive
constructions and simultaneously contest them as basis for their exclusion from
Jordanian state-building, an exclusion that still tends to be framed through the
theme of the right of return, but in fact particularly targets the poorest and the
less loyal to the Hashemite Kingdom amongst the Palestinians in Jordan. Wisam,
whose family was expelled from Kuwait after the Gulf war in the early 1990s and
found shelter in the Hittin camp, where some of his relatives already lived,
clearly conveys what most refugees we talked to widely espoused:
They do not give the raqam watani to the Gazawi. And they say it is related
to nuzul haqq al-awda [the issue of the right of return]. But the Gazawi
want the raqam watani not so that they give up haqq al-awda [. . .] they
want it to improve their situation here [. . .] Even those who [already] have
raqam watani, they don’t see a relation to haqq al- awda.
The Hashemite project of assimilation and the reduction of Palestinians into an
invisible political and national community is internalised by certain refugees and
highly contested by others. Um Ghazi who is a Jordanian citizen, noted in the
course of one long conversation: “I am Jordanian, but my origin is crucial to me
[. . .] here in Jordan we just live [. . .] we are just guests, diuf, we are not ahl el
ard, (the original owners/people of the land).” What this means is eloquently
illustrated by Abla Abu Helbe, a Palestinian member of the Jordanian parliament
who talked to us at length about the contradictions and difficulties that
Palestinians face in Jordan:
I am in the parliament [. . .]. I have the right to be elected and to elect and
to all civil rights [. . .] however, like for the Jordanians, citizenship does not
mean rights [. . .] [In addition] Not all Palestinians here have civil rights.
There are 500,000 people who have no rights, the [dwellers of ] Gaza camp,
30 km from Jarash, [those in the] South and Aqaba [. . .] they don’t have
any rights [. . .] they get accepted only into private universities, thanks to the
money received from migrants in the Khalij [. . .] they get high scores, but
then they don’t have work [. . .].
25 R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1998.
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2.2. Hierarchies of lives in Lebanon
Most of Lebanon’s recent history revolves around the presence of Palestinians. At
the end of 2009, Palestinians in Lebanon represented 10 per cent of the Lebanese
population and 53 per cent of the 425,640 refugees lived in the 12 UNRWA
administered camps or in other areas and gatherings.26 The 1975–1990 civil war
saw a high toll of death, with Palestinians being attacked by both Israel and the
Christian right wing militias. While the ingredients of the war were to do with
sectarianism, class, and regional interests and interferences, at the end of the civil
war Palestinians were and still are today perceived in the collective memory as
those to be blamed for the shaky political and sectarian grounds on which the
country still stands. The life of Palestinian refugees, especially in Beirut, is
marked by vivid memory of massacres where thousands of innocent refugees,
including women and children, were slaughtered. During the civil war, on 16–18
September 1982 after the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut, the Sabra and
Chatila refugees were massacred at the hand of Christian Phalangist militias
protected by the Israeli army, which surrounded the camps, supposedly in re-
taliation for the assassination of President Gemayel for which Palestinians were
held wrongly responsible. This was the first act of a prolonged “war of the
camps”, which lasted until 1987, a time in which Palestinian innocents would
be furthered attacked by the Shi’a Amal militas backed by Syria, a war that left
behind the destruction of the Beirut camps and thousands of martyrs. Seldom, a
family we interviewed in Bourj el Barajneh, Sabra, or Chatila have not had a
martyr buried during the war of the camps.
Since the exile of the PLO, the life and prospect of Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon has progressively deteriorated. Most notably, Palestinians are
today suffering the exclusion from most civil, social, and political rights and
entitlements, institutionalised with the suspension of the Cairo agreements
signed by Lebanon in 1969 and only recently slightly alleviated. Such discrim-
ination and exclusion from civil and social rights is legitimised through a two-
fold legal and discursive expedient. On the one hand, the trap of the need
for a clause of reciprocity, which is of course not possible for Palestinians
in the absence of a sovereign nation-state. On the other hand, political rhetoric
maintains this exclusion as necessary to avoid tawtin (naturalisation) and to
ensure the right of return for Palestinians. In fact, most refugees perceptively
underline that the real reasons for the ban of Palestinians from social and
political rights is the preservation of a precarious sectarian ‘balance’, which in
turn contributes to maintain Palestinians as a docile population, dependent on
humanitarian aid, ultimately a class of disenfranchised subjected to exploitation
and easily transformed into scapegoats in case of internal and international
cleavages.
26 J. Suleiman, Marginalised Community. The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Development Research
Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty University of Sussex, 2006.
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Imad, who works for an international NGO in one of the Beirut camps,
described the plague of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in the following way:
Here in Lebanon the Lebanese say that if the Palestinians work, they will
forget the Palestinian cause. But this is only a pretext [. . .] Lebanese con-
sider giving us rights tawtin because we are Sunni. They are afraid that we
will become the majority [. . .] that we would change the balance in the
parliament [. . .]. But this is only a pretext. When Hariri [father] came, it
started to be forbidden for Palestinians to own property: now you can rent,
but you cannot buy. You might be able to buy, but not properly register
your properties. Of course, if you have someone in your family who is
Lebanese or a foreigner, then you can register your property in their
name. The only way here to be and live properly as Palestinian is when
you have another passport. Most people here try to get another passport.
We have the UN card, but then everyone tries to get a foreign passport to
claim rights.
And he added:
[. . .] It is completely unfair: all Arabs can come here and buy, but we can’t.
Most Gulfi have bought here. For example most houses on the seaside are
owned by Gulfi, Saudi, Qatari [. . .].
Abu Ayman is one of those Palestinians lying at the bottom of the hierarchy. One
of the hundreds of forgotten, invisible Palestinians abandoned after a life devoted
to the resistance movement. A several times displaced and a refugee, then cast off
by the departure and exile of the PLO in 1982 and finally left stateless with the
withdrawal of his documents from the Jordanians, Abu Ayman, who trained as
an engineer, lived his life between the West Bank, Turkey, where he studied, Syria
where he joined the resistance movement, Iraq and finally Lebanon. He is one of
those 4,000 non-ID refugees who came to Lebanon as a result of the exile of
PLO troops or cadres from other Arab countries.27 He resorted to sell Chinese
toys on a cart in the narrow streets of Chatila camp to support his family.
Abu Ayman narrated his story in his bare house in Chatila. His words were
not filled with bitterness as one would imagine, but rather imbued with that
profound awareness, which so often accompanies refugees’ narratives, of being
part of a larger, deeper, complex collective history where the single had not
agency to act upon.
[. . .] During my early years in Lebanon, I was part of the resistance.
I worked in journalism and civil engineering, translation, graphic design
on the computer. Ten years later, I was no longer part of the factions of
the revolutionary movement – so I had to resort to civil work to help
my children. In reality, there is an exception to my case because I carry
the Jordanian nationality so I came to Lebanon illegally. I don’t have any
27 Ibid.
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papers – the Jordanians stopped my papers – not to me only, but also to my
wife and my children. And the Lebanese won’t give me papers either, so
I faced a very complicated situation. When I got married in 1989, my wife
and my seven children didn’t have any official documents related to the
Lebanese state. So when I searched for a job in my field – be it engineering
or journalism – I faced an issue, because whoever wants to hire you needs
[you to have] documents. These documents however don’t exist. So they
could not let someone work without papers issued in Lebanon. This drove
me to selling toys on a cart. [. . .]
3. Emplacement and displacement
3.1. Jordan: From the “ camp as the nation” to the “nation as a
performance”
Randa Farah writing about the political life of refugees in Jordan in the 1960s
represented it as an epoch:28
[. . .] when the poetics and politics of place coincided: the spatial, albeit
imaginary, boundaries of the camps henceforth invoked a constellation of
political meanings, primarily the right of return, now positioned at the core
of the national narrative. The camp as icon of the nation became central to
the Palestinian imaginary.29
Abla Abu Helbe, a Palestinian MP in the Jordanian Parliament during a long
conversation we had in her office in Amman, described refugees in the camps as:
[. . .] like any other society [. . .]. Palestinians are part of the society [. . .]
there are rich and poor amongst Palestinians like among Jordanians [. . .] it
does not have necessarily to do with being refugee in a camp [. . .] many
people could not go out from the camp, because they did not have money
[. . . however] the camp remains also a symbolic site [. . .] for the Palestinian
question. The ones who live in the camp are more linked to the Awda than
those outside, their identity is more influenced by that [. . .] they are all
linked to the Palestinian question not so much from a political perspective,
but from a social perspective [. . .] by going to UNRWA, by the things that
they wear, such as their tatreez [embroidered dresses] [. . .] For example, you
see women waiting outside the UNRWA offices doors who would always
28 R. Farah, “Refugee Camps in the Palestinian and Sahrawi National Liberation Movements: A Comparative
Perspective”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 38(2), Winter 2009, 76–93.
29 Randa Farah suggests that “Despite UNRWA’s decisive role in shaping the refugees’ social and economic
universes, humanitarian aid was insufficient to sustain families. To supplement their rations in host societies,
many refugees worked as seasonal laborers or in low-paying jobs outside the camps. Economic insecurity and
the leadership vacuum, combined with political repression and alienation, reinforced informal personal
relationships rooted in reciprocity, kin ties, and patronage links extending to multiple institutions. For
example, having connections with Jordanian officials or UNRWA employees could improve one’s chances
of obtaining better services, while former village networks and camp neighborhoods provided moral, social,
and economic support”, in ibid., 83.
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say: ‘May Allah get us out of this issue and let us return to Palestine so to
finish from this wikala (UNRWA)’. So all these social dimensions push
them to have more relation with the Palestinian identity and question.
In these two quotations, we are offered very vivid illustrations of the shifts
undergone by refugee camps and/as the “nation”. While in the 1960s the
camp was the nation, in the sense of privileged political and symbolic sites for
fashioning the nation in exile, today, with the end of the camp as an active and
armed space of national resistance, the nation is a social and cultural perform-
ance and UNRWA its Janus-faced side. The nation is mainly evoked during the
commemoration of the crucial dates in Palestinians’ history of dispossession,
such as May 1948 or June 1967. On these memorial occasions, children of
the camps are dressed up with Palestinian embroidered outfits and perform
scenes of the past life, the peasant life of 1948, the resistance and fighting, the
martyrs and the hope for return, symbolised by the key.30 These practices could
be defined as “performances of return”, and carry simultaneously a political and
poetic meaning which also denote a refugee “group identity” inscribed in and
across the camp.
However, socio-economic integration is enacted along with the creative
retention or reinvention of a distinct camp and refugee identity. Camps like
Bak’a and Wihdat today operate simultaneously as refugee camps and as urban
or semi-urban neighbourhoods and represent urban focal spaces with their popu-
lar and competitive markets, shops, and social activities that attract thousands of
residents also from other areas. As a dweller in Wihdat put it:
It is a city, a big city. It has a lot of people, many shops, it is life. I know every
inch of Wihdat. That is why I came back to Wihdat. I see a lot of people
come and go to the market. I smell the good flavours, I eat the fresh food.
These things you cannot see anywhere else. Not like Shmeisani. There you
don’t know who lives above you. Now in Ramadan we share food between
the neighbours. This is the life in the camp it is not like that outside.
The camp is a space of warmth and intimacy, characterised by a unique
moral economy of relatedness and support, and yet interconnectedness and
porosity are also at stake. In Jordan, many camps have extended outside the
official boundaries that territorially delimit them and developed in areas in close
proximity. Wissam, like many others, mentioned in this regard: “When I marry
I will move to Marka. It is outside of the camp, but at the same time it is near
to it.”
Refugees represent this moving out not as an exit, but as a process of
extending the camp beyond its official territorial borders. The camp in this
perspective becomes a flexible, symbolic, and political, rather than territorial
30 See Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine.
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space. It is an identity space represented by the willingness to carry a memory
and a right, and not to assimilate, as Ali’s words’ convey:
My grandpa had a big family. Wihdat was too small to get all families next
to each other. So the camp became bigger, like an onion. We made the
borders of Wihdat. The government puts it much smaller.
As evidence of the unwillingness to assimilate, refugees have adamantly resisted
the persistent attempts by the Jordanian government to name the camps into hai,
urban districts, as this would symbolically and politically erase their history of
suffering and temporariness which is still awaiting recognition and compensation.
For a long time it was also believed that people in camps would be more
linked to Palestine by virtue of their poverty and encapsulation. However, class,
political culture, generation, and access to rights intersect and produce different
narratives and imaginaries of return. Most notably, adhering to the right of
return as a project is clearly transversal to camp and non-camp dwelling.31
Many refugees in Jordan are keen in underlining that their resoluteness to
holding onto the right of return is disconnected from living or not in a terri-
torially delineated refugee camp:
Abu Fadi, a sympathiser of Hamas from Hittin camp, for example, believes
that the relation between willingness to return and leaving the camp is a rather
weak one. He said with political lucidity and without hesitation:
[. . .] If haqq al-awda had any relation to the mukhayyam [the camp], they
would have taken the camps away long time ago. There is absolutely no
connection between the two. It is a qadiat al-qalb, mish as-sakan [an issue of
the heart, not the place of living].
Another dweller stresses how leaving or not leaving the camp depends on having
resources to do so and does not impact on the right of return:
There is no possibility to leave the camp. You need money. People want to
leave. Palestinians living in Europe should also have national belief (aqida
wattaniyya). It should not depend on the place you live whether you have
national belief or not. It does not depend on whether you live in the
mukhayyam or outside either.
For many who moved out of the camp particularly, their refugee identity and
status and the right of return is embedded with and transferred onto the card al
wikala, the UNRWA registration card: “If you lose your card al wikala that is like
losing Palestine” it was told to us by a refugee of Hittin. Indeed, upon visiting
families in both Jordan and Lebanon, the UNRWA registration card was shown
to us almost simultaneously with the pictures of the martyrs. Whether it repre-
sents a passport to survival, as it is the case for the most disenfranchised, or a
31 For a compelling analysis of the weak relation between nationalism and camp dwelling in Lebanon see S.
Hanafi, “Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: Laboratory of Indocile Identity Formation”, in M.A.
Khalidi, Manifestations of Identity. The Lived Reality of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Beirut, Institut
franc¸ais du Proche-Orient (IFPO), 2010, 45–74.
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symbolic piece of paper stored in a box together with other “return memora-
bilia”, the card al wikala remains central in Palestinian refugees’ identities.
3.2. Lebanon: Exception as a third space
Despite the suspension and exception Palestinians in Lebanon are subjected to,
emplacement and displacement stand in a dynamic relation. Bourj el Barajneh
and Chatila by virtue of their location in urban Beirut have, with time, become
fluid urban spaces, and developed zones of interaction with the sovereign terri-
tory and subjects. Refugees from Chatila and Bourj el Barajneh are simultan-
eously excluded from and included into the “sovereign” territory in hierarchical
ways. For example chemists, small clinics, and opticians operate in the camps
privately and unofficially, but face severe hindrances as they can only prescribe
certain basic medications and are obliged to smuggle medicines in the camp
from outside. As it was explained to us by a Chatila resident:
Doctors can practice inside the camp, but not outside. They rent a house,
but there is no insurance (if something happens to the patient). He [the
doctor] can write prescriptions for medicines then you can get this medicine
inside the camp in a pharmacy, but for neurological medicines for example,
you can only get it outside [. . .] a doctor needs a certain government
registration number in order to prescribe this sort of medication. The
ones in the camp don’t have this registration, they operate unofficially.
Exception extends beyond the spatial boundaries of the camp. Palestinian taxi
drivers, whether they live in the camps or not, are not able to be fully insured,
they buy the plate and pay the fees to drive privately, but are not covered in case
something happens. Similarly, manual workers are offered the lowest working
conditions and subject to arbitrary firing with no protection. As one taxi driver
put it:
Palestinians can work as chauffeur. They buy the number plate but it is very
expensive. Lebanese get benefits from social security. Palestinians buy the
plate, but do not get anything in exchange. A Palestinian cannot get a license
as a taxi driver. So if you have an accident, you are in trouble. At the check-
point, they usually don’t do anything. There is no law! If there is no law it is
much more difficult. So they might even take the number from him.
A whole system partially sidestepping the suspension and exclusion to which
Palestinians are subject to emerged over the years making these camps today into
relatively porous social and territorial spaces characterised by a moral economy of
exchange and fluidity through markets, marriages, smuggling, emigration, and
immigration.32 The juridical-discursive apparatus of exception does not
32 On mobility and migration flows and urbanisation see: M.K. Dorai, “Palestinian Refugee Camps in
Lebanon. Emigration, Mobility and the Urbanization Process”, in A. Knudsen & S. Hanafi (eds.),
Palestinian Refugees. Identity, Space and Place in the Levant, London, Routledge 2011, 67–81. For the
transformation that refugee camps are undergoing in different parts of the world, see: M. Agier,
Managing the Undesirables. Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011.
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incarcerate or separate refugees as bare life but it rather ends up normalising an
ephemeral space of partial, insecure, and informal entitlements for Palestinians in
Lebanon. As will be shown later, it also gives birth to a grey area of intercon-
nectedness, a lively third space of critical awareness, a standpoint from which
detecting and critically uttering the aporia of the Lebanese shaky nation-state
building project.
4. Rights and return. Return as dignity
Accessing rights is one of the major priorities of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
A unison claim can be summed up like: “We don’t want their citizenship, we
don’t want to be Lebanese, give us just the rights!” A variation of the theme was
vividly expressed by an elderly refugee from Bourj el Barajneh, who eloquently
stated: “Jinsiya hiya wasila – nationality is just a means to an end. Nothing more
than that.”
In this re-articulation of rights as something detached from national belong-
ing and membership, the watan, homeland, maintains its centrality as the place of
origin, the place where refugees “own the land” and are “ahl el ard” a notion that
carries much wider and profound meanings than personal propriety or national
identity. As I described earlier, being ahl el ard points, in most dispossessed refu-
gees’ eyes, to land owning which conferred personhood and status, dignity, but it
also refers to belonging and identity, to family genealogy, roots, and legitimacy.
One day we had a revealing conversation with Abu Ayman about “watan”
(homeland), tawtin (naturalisation), and rights. Watan is in his narrative equated
to a mother, something very common in Palestinians’ iconography, where gen-
dered narratives of the nation as a fertile land, as a violated and fragile spouse or
as a mother are allegorically evoked. The mother/watan, in Abu Ayman’s view,
can never be exchanged:
[. . .] the watan to the person is the mother. My mother may be old, she
may not be pretty, and she may be imperfect. But if you ask me to replace
my old mother with a younger, healthier girl, I cannot. She is my blood and
flesh. My watan is my mother. The watan is a mother. You cannot replace
your watan. Your real mother is your original watan. You cannot replace
your watan with another, even if it provides you with opportunities and
with all what you may want. I believe that tawtin, for the Palestinian people,
is like cutting the Palestinians from their roots and their land, their
ancestors. For me, and I believe that 90 per cent of the Palestinians in
the shatat [diaspora] share my idea, tawtin would kill the Palestinian
people. If you cut the roots, the tree will die. Tawtin would cut the roots
of the Palestinians. Tawtin is a case of death, in the material and emotional
sense. [Yet] Palestinians in the shatat hope that these states will provide
humanitarian and civil rights, which will allow them to work.
Abu Ayman’s articulation of tawtin as death of the nation evokes his refusal
of assimilation, his fear of the annihilation of Palestinian national identity,
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the cutting of the tree from the roots. Tawtin means being forced to accept
another watan, another homeland, and this is unacceptable for Palestinians.
However, Abu Ayman explains, rights could be and should be dissociated
from the watan:
When you give Palestinians a nationality, you are giving them a watan.
However, I find a difference in the core. So, the Palestinian who migrates
to Germany, and a few years later takes the German nationality, this is not
bad because it means giving him a nationality which will allow him [sic]
mobility. Tawtin is in the way it is offered [. . .] it is keeping them [the
Palestinians] and liquidating them into the host country – and this is un-
acceptable. But, giving the Palestinian in Germany or Sweden or wherever
he may be, a nationality in order to ensure mobility, so he can get married
and live with dignity – I don’t think this is bad.
Even if a person can only have one homeland, as one only has only one mother,
rights can and should still be achieved in the country where one lives. Accessing
rights, according to Abu Ayman, is different from top-down tawtin.
Particularly revealing and recurring in our interviews is the distinction that
refugees operate between an individual, “bottom up” strategy of life that includes
accessing rights and citizenship in the host countries, and a “top-down” impos-
ition of naturalisation and assimilation from above, a form of forced tawtin,
which threatens the refugees with assimilation, disappearance, and politically
disqualifies them from their right of return.
4.1. Shi’a vs Sunni Fattoush. Rethinking rights, contesting sectarianism
In Bourj el Barajeh and Chatila, most refugees we interviewed echoed the following
statement by Um Muhammad: “We are sunni. The shi’ia don’t want our tajnees
[naturalisation], because it would create imbalance between shia and sunni.” Most
Palestinians we talked to in Lebanon are adamant that their exclusion from most
entitlements is not about upholding their right of return, as political rhetoric
maintains, but is in fact clearly tied to racism and to the wish of preserving the
balance of a problematic sectarian, confessional system.
In the Bourj el Barajneh camp Samira, who acts as the director of the
women’s association, and other women who were present during our visit,
offered an eloquent picture of how sectarianism operates in Lebanon. Fadia,
from the Bourj camp, maintained:
[. . .] there is a lot of talk that sunni would take over [if Palestinian get tajanus,
nationality], but if someone takes an American passport do they ask him
whether he is a Muslim? It shouldn’t play a role. They asked me whether I
would become Christian [to get tajanus] but I refused [. . .] This issue [of
rights] should have nothing to do with being Muslim or Christian [...]
According to Fadia citizenship in Lebanon has never been about belonging to
a nation: “If you had money you could buy citizenship. But today it is not like
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this anymore. It was more after the war of the camps. I was 21 when it happened.
Now it doesn’t happen anymore. Now they don’t want to tajanus anyone any-
more”, and her friend Amal adds: “If you had any respect for yourself you
wouldn’t stay here. Many people think like that.”
Not only belonging to a specific religious sect shapes, most notably, iden-
tities, access to resources, political positions, and kin relations. It also fuels pas-
sionate debates on food and football as Samira notes:
My husband likes Hariri. He talks all the time about Hariri. So I asked him:
where are we? And I put a picture of Arafat [. . .]. The mother of my
husband is Lebanese and they grew up with Lebanese [. . .]. But there are
also other Palestinians who support Hariri. In the football world cup it was
like this: those with Hariri supported Germany, and those with Hizbullah
supported Brazil. When there was the world cup, nobody would care about
Palestine – everybody was just with the football. Al Tareq al-Jadideh [mainly
Muslim- Sunni neighbourhood] was with Germany and Al-Dahyah [the
Muslim-Shi’a neighbourhood] was with Brazil [. . .].
Another young lady in the room was convinced that “In Lebanon there will
never be an agreement. You have this [factionalism] everywhere – in football, in
basketball, everywhere” and another woman joined the discussion maintaining
that “[. . .] There are even arguments on how to make Fattoush [Lebanese salad]
the Sunni versus the Shi’a way!”.
The discussion acquired a more serious tone when Samira mentioned that
some close members of her family converted and became Shi’a to manage
through their life. Conversion, as a way to exit disenfranchisement and to
access entitlements, was frequently referred to during our interviews and con-
versations, although there are no official data confirming this:
There are Palestinians who are becoming Shi’a. It is happening now [...] My
sister in law and her husband turned Shi’a. Her husband now works for
Hizbullah [. . .] In the hospitals or anywhere else nowadays everything is
always just for Shi’a [. . .] There are many who became Shi’a.
In addition to the strong feeling that the negation of rights to Palestinians in
Lebanon is the result of sectarian cleavages and political arithmetic, refugees’
narratives make constant reference to “being used” in national and sectarian
political cleavages, or of representing an easy scapegoat, all in the name of
their right of return.
Fadia again expresses this widespread feeling very clearly by suggesting that
even the vexed question of the impossibility for Lebanese women to transmit
nationality has been framed by the government as an attempt to avoid the
tawtin, naturalisation, of children and spouses of Palestinian men.
The government said that its resistance to allow women to passing on
citizenship is because of Palestinians – but that’s not true! Anybody could
buy it [. . .] and there isn’t a high number of marriages between Palestinians
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and Lebanese. Maybe 10 per cent [...] Sometimes we are the exception, and
other times we are blamed as the cause [. . .]. They should stop using us
Palestinians as scapegoats for everything.
The perception of being scapegoats, pawns used in the local, national, and
foreign politics of Lebanon, also thanks to the co-optation and agreement of
the factions, is widespread and is particularly poignantly expressed by Raed
who is an NGO worker and very active in his camp, Chatila. He embodies
the disillusion of the young generation of Palestinians with factionalism, nation-
alist politics as well as with Lebanese rhetoric on tawtin. Raed, whom we visited
in his house on several occasions throughout the last two years, offered lucid
and realistic political perspectives that shaped our understanding of internal
dynamics within the camp and more widely in Lebanon. On many occasions,
he denounced the corruption and the lack of accountability of the factions and
urged Palestinians not to be instrumentalised by Lebanese internal politics and
by Palestinians’ factions’ power games.
An eloquent illustration of these worries were the dynamics around the
demonstration of May 2011 on the occasion of the Nakba commemoration
day, when a few thousands Palestinian refugees marched to the border between
Lebanon and Israel and two of them were shot. This demonstration, which was
part of a global campaign was, in Lebanon, organized with the necessary logis-
tical support of Hizbullah, which real aim, according to Raed, was to channel,
control, and instrumentalise Palestinian political mobilisation for other ends,
rather than genuinely supporting the Palestinian right to return. A similar epi-
sode happened when Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006.
Again Hizbullah asked the pro-syrian Palestinian coalition, Tahalof, to send
Palestinians to demonstrate at the Bab Fatima gate, to distract the attention of
the Israeli army, while Hizbullah guerrillas kidnapped the Israeli soldiers at an-
other point of the border. On that occasion, many thousands refugees from
Chatila and Bourj el Barajneh went down to the demonstration and a few
were shot dead. While Raed recognized that also Palestinian prisoners were
exchanged thanks to Hizbullah’s operations, he and other young refugees adam-
antly contest the ways in which Palestinians are turned into an unaware mass,
used as cannon fodder, denied of political agency and equality in the political
process and decision-making.
Similarly, during and after the 18 months confrontation between Hizbullah
and The Future Party in 2008–2009,33 guns were distributed in camps in an
attempt to foster Palestinians support for the Future party in the conflict. “The
Lebanese army does not enter the camp, but everyone has a gun in the house.
Even outside the camp some people have guns.” Yet, guns have been in camps
33 The confrontation was sparked by the Government on 7 May 2008 in an attempt to seize and shut
Hizbollahs’ telecommunication system by The Future Party.
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much before the very recent confrontation, since the times of the war of the
camps, Raed explained:
Weapons inside need political agreement with, for example, Syria. Some
camps have no check points [. . .] there is no checkpoint in, for example,
Chatila. In Ein Hilweh there are agreements between Lebanese [the Army]
and the camp. The Lebanese army cannot enter the camp, so they need
someone to control from inside. But when Abbas came here he said: “we
live here under Lebanese law, we must go by that.” So that means that he is for
the withdrawal of weapons from the camp [. . .]. The Lebanese want to get
the weapons out of the camp, but in exchange they must offer something:
rights [. . .]. We are concerned only about practicing the rights, not about
being Lebanese. But they say offering rights is tawtin. Both the Lebanese and
Palestinian factions say that. The Palestinian faction’s existence depends on
the difficult situation of the Palestinians. So the Palestinian factions use this in
a clever way. If you want to make the camp look nice: that’s tawtin. If you
want to change the sewage system: that’s tawtin [. . .]. And probably half of
them [members of the lajna, factions] live outside the camp.
In this quotation, Raed compellingly conveys the frustration of Palestinian refu-
gees in Lebanon, especially of the younger generation, towards the rhetoric of
tawtin as expressed by the powers-that-be. As I have tried to show above, for the
older generation who has seen the defeat of the resistance movement in Lebanon,
who sacrificed its children and who now feels abandoned by the national lead-
ership, the ways in which tawtin is mobilised to avoid granting Palestinians rights
and dignity disclose mere racism. On the other hand, the younger generation, of
which Raed is a member, shows disenchantment and disaffection towards views
which, in the current climate, sound purely hypocritical and merely aiming at
the self-survival of the political factions.
4.2. Ahl al ard
In this context, the imaginary of return emphasised by Umm Ghazi earlier in the
paper acquires full sense. Being ahl al ard, in Umm Ghazi’s terms, confers
identity, belonging, legitimacy, and status. It is the original land that once
provided refugees with dignity and social personhood. Return, at least for the
first two generations of refugees, is therefore imagined and represented, in the
first place, as a return to the land from which the Palestinians were expelled in
1948, since status and identity can never be reclaimed and achieved through
return to the 1967 land. Wisam’s uncle, who lives in Hittin, poignantly clarifies
this point:
I am originally from Zeita, a village in 1948 near Khalil, which was com-
pletely destroyed. From there we moved to Khalil and in 1967 we came to
Jordan. First we lived in Amman, at my uncle’s for a short time, then we
moved here to the camp Schniller [Hittin] [. . .]. My children moved out of
the camp. There is no space here. They built outside the camp. However, all
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my kids are very attached to the 1948 land [...] ‘48 is our land, not ‘67.
We are both lajieen and naziheen.34 In the ‘67 we had just a house, but not
land. In the ‘48 [areas] we have land and we have the registration papers
for this land. It is ours. I am not sure I would return. I would stay here – I
have my work here, I live here, my children and my family are here. Why
would I go back? However, if I would return, I would return only to Zeita,
to my village in 1948. I would not return to 67 [West Bank]. I would go
back to 48 and become a fellah [peasant]. I would do agricultural work
there. In ‘48, we have 600 dunum land. It’s better, here we have no property
or land and I have no lands in 67. My property land is in 48. I would build
a house there.
Clearly, return is not simply about national self-determination or national
membership, but it is rather and mainly imagined as a re-rooting or a
re-inscription into the moral economy and status that owning the lands con-
ferred Palestinians with.
Political orientation, religious, and cultural identifications also impinge
upon imaginaries of return. For Abu Fadhi, who sympathises with Hamas,
return would be first to dignity, embodied by a “country” with no racism, but
also to Palestine as home to the sacred Islamic holy sites, for which loss there can
be no compensation:
Life in Palestine would be better. There would be a government and no
‘unsuriya [racism]. Here there is ‘unsuriya. We are not from here [mish ibn
al-balad]. Our idea is to return. We would definitely return [. . .]. There is no
place [dawla] in the world more beautiful than Palestine. That is why the Jews
picked it [. . .] Taw’eed [compensation] is unconceivable for us. Everyone who
has a brain must understand that we must return to Palestine. The Muslims
must return to their holy sites. [. . .] Are they going to bring our holy sites
here, the haram? We are without country and without a nation [bidun balad
and bidun watan]. In Islam they say those who are without a country, have no
karama. Like the fish without water.
4.3. The birth of a “political society” ?
Upon meeting refugees in Lebanon, the conversation would often commence
with a long description of the day. Typically, one of the women of the family
would have just come back from a visit to an organization, a charity, an NGO in
search for resources: “We had to take debts. There are some charitable organ-
izations, but they only give a fourth of what is needed. Nothing more than that.
NGOs give only a little, and UNRWA pays for two-three days hospital” uttered
Um Muhammad when we interviewed her in her house in the Bourj camp.
Other common statements would point to the ways in which docility and con-
trol are highly tied with distribution of resources and to how political parties and
34 Refugees from 1948 and displaced from 1967.
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organizations distribute resources in exchange for loyalty and consent: “Some of
the Lebanese Islamic organizations help us [. . .]. Hamas charitable organizations
help, but you need to be with them, I tried to get help, but they didn’t’ give it to
me, because I am not with Hamas.” Similarly, we hear that “The parties are still
strong, because they are the only ones that actually help. But the old ones, where
should they go? The parties are not interested in them.”
After the departure of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, which provided not
only a political identity and a national project but also strong economic and
social support and protection, humanitarian aid, political factions’ conditional
provisions, and remittances from relatives who managed to emigrate, became the
main means of survival. Everything, from being cured to finding a job to even
obtaining a place to bury a deceased requires a constant and strenuous hunting
for resources, a draining activity that becomes a full-time occupation. This has
become a systematised mechanism for managing and controlling affiliations and
loyalties. Palestinians are obliged to resort to wasta (connections) or to beg for
the right contacts, networks, charities, and NGOs, to reach the necessary amount
of money to be treated or buried. Resting in peace is not to be given for granted
for Palestinians, who have no automatic right to be buried in the local cemeteries
in Beirut. Piling bodies on the top of each other, in the limited space available in
one grave, has become common practice amongst Palestinian refugees in Beirut,
while the elites and the PLO cadres, even from the Diaspora, have often secured
a space in the cemetery of the martyrs, a sad and tragic continuation of their
privileges during their life time.
“Everything is through wasta” explained with resignation Um Muhammad
from Bourj and other common complaints composed a litany: “There are some
international donors that help”; “I needed 500 dollars for an operation, but no
one helped me.” Of course, we also collected statements where the exception
confirmed the rule. “A Fatah guy from Rashidiyya helped me, and without any
wasta.” And further “I don’t want to be in any connection with any political
party”.
Other persistent narratives conveying the frustration and anger of camp
dwellers revolve around the lack of proper supply of electricity and water and
the lack of transparency over the destination of the fees dwellers have to pay to
the factions and camp committees who control the distribution of these provi-
sions. In addition, we heard stories from camp refugees who had to fight with the
popular committees to claim their properties back, as houses’ transactions are
only informally registered in the camps. Outside the camps Palestinians need a
Lebanese to register the property in his/her name, meaning that arbitrariness and
inability to take possessions back can always be at stake, but propriety in the
camp maybe similarly gloomy and uncertain.
In this context, younger generations of educated Palestinians are expressing
a ferocious criticism not only towards the Lebanese juridical-discursive exception
and its underpinning confessional rationale, but also towards Palestinian popular
committees, the UNRWA system and the humanitarian logic. Popular commit-
tees are described as corrupted, lacking any accountability and political
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representativeness. Such criticism is uttered through various forms and lan-
guages, ranging from emerging hip-hop radical bands such as the Khatiba 5,
now very popular across the region, to new independent grass-root organizations
which priority agenda is to activate networks of support outside the humanitar-
ian circuits.35 This is the agenda of a small but very active organization,
“People-to-People”, which headquarter is the Sabra gathering and whose
declared aim is to reactivate solidarity chains bypassing the humanitarian ma-
chinery altogether, a system that in their view reproduces itself and reinforces
dependency rather than creating opportunities for those it declares to assist.
In Chatila, the “Refugee Dream Organization” is trying to challenge exist-
ing forms of camp governmentality and representations and to initiate alterna-
tive, democratic, and bottom-up representative bodies that can truly bring
people’s needs and interests at centre stage. In an interview with one of the
founders of the Refugee Dream Organization it became clear that part of
younger generation of the camp is not willing to put up with old forms
of camp control by the factions (Tanzimat) and the committees. The latter
have ultimately produced elites and secured privileges for themselves exhausting
in so doing their previous political legitimacy. They became intimidating entities
busy with distributing resources, controlling affiliations, and securing loyalties
for their survival. The changing configurations of the camps of Chatila and
Bourj el Barajneh, particularly their slow transformation into urban slums
and the ensuing dynamics this entails (drug selling, violence, lack of security),
together with the end of old forms of solidarities and relatedness that constituted
the ethos of the camp in the past also contribute to create the feeling, among
some components of the new generation, that new forms of democratic repre-
sentation and bottom up political participation are needed to address the future
challenges.
On the occasion of the Arafat memorial day in September 2011 in the
Chatila camp, in a rare moment of self-criticism, one of the local leaders of the
Popular Front avowed: “[. . .] people have no trust in us anymore, they gave us
their children, they gave us their lives and we gave them back nothing.” This
admission does not only dramatically symbolise the end of an era, that of the
nationalist resistance movement in exile and its the human losses that have never
been compensated for and are rarely commemorated, but it lucidly underscores
the final outcome of this era: the implicit exclusion of refugees from the
two-state consensus of the post-Oslo era, which contributed to the making of
refugees in Lebanon into one of the most disenfranchised national communities
in exile.
35 For a critique of the humanitarian management of Palestianians see in particular, I. Feldman, R. Bocco & J.
Al Husseini, “Dynamics of Humanitarian Aid, Local and Regional Politics: The Palestine Refugees as a Case
Study”, in A. Knudsen & S. Hanafi (eds.), Palestinian Refugees. Identity, Space and Place in the Levant,
London, Routledge, 2011, 128–147 ; Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair. For a more general analysis see:
Agier, Managing the Undesirables; J. Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of
Humanitarianism, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
Refugee Survey Quarterly 89
 at School of O
riental and A







The emergence of the Palestinian refugee issue was concomitant with that of
modern independent nation-states in the region. Refugees’ life histories, iden-
tities, and socio-economic status are profoundly implicated in processes of other-
ing, essential to the fabrication of these instable and precarious national identities
and communities. The diversity of the various locations of displacement cannot
and should not, of course, be ignored. Palestinians live under different predica-
ments in their countries of exile.36 In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees are a class
of disenfranchised, deprived of most civil, socio-economic, let alone political
entitlements and are subjected to a dehumanising humanitarian assistance.
In Jordan most, but certainly not all, Palestinians are given full rights, symbolised
by a “rakam watani”, a “national number” but are increasingly subject to
an arbitrary withdrawal of their passports, an intimidating practice aimed at
completing the transformation of Palestinians in Jordan into docile subjects by
the Hashemite Sovereign. Docility reinforces the widespread and rooted narra-
tive of Palestinians as “guests” (diuf ) rather than citizens. This process astound-
ingly echoes Agamben’s analysis of the sovereign’s historical prerogative to
suspend the rule of law and sovereignty at his discretion.
However, Palestinian refugees’ practices, accounts, and analyses, matured
from various standpoints of marginality or suspension of the rule, offer formid-
able grounds for analysing not only refugees’ predicaments, but also the specific
aporia, contradictions and precarious nature of nationality, citizenship, and
rights in the host Arab States in which they have been displaced over 60 years
ago. Palestinian refugees offer a “subaltern” voice, that strives to re-inscribe itself
in the political, by deconstructing and challenging the dominant tropes that have
sustained their exclusion from rights (in Lebanon) or that have constructed and
naturalised them as a “different” yet “assimilable” population (in Jordan), a
strategy they perceive to aim at legitimising their precarious status, and simul-
taneously at making them a politically invisible and silent, national community.
Jamila and others’ accounts presented in this paper, give shape to an embryonic
refugee political identity, a new political subjectivity that destabilises nation-state
configurations, and simultaneously unfolds the specific drawbacks of nationality
and citizenship in the Middle East. This appears crucial at a time when the
symbolic, political, and material dimensions of dignity, rights, and state/society
and minorities/majorities relations are at stake all over the region.
All refugees across gender, generation, and locations share the idea that
return is an individual, inalienable right, which cannot be negotiated or dis-
missed from above. This sacred principle does not, however, contrast with in-
dividual and collective strategies and narratives of rights and political agency
from below. Far from being just passive victims, Palestinian refugees articulate a
36 In fact, a recurrent narrative is that the more politically, economically, and socially integrated Palestinian
refugees can be, the more they would be likely to achieve the social and political capital, which is critical to
mobilize for the right of return, in creative and productive ways.
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powerful critique towards sectarian neo-patrimonial regimes where resources
and entitlements are highly layered and hierarchically distributed according to
ethnicity, religious affiliation, nationality, class, gender, and family status. They
utter their frustration towards the lack of accountability and the corruption of
their local leaderships, they loudly outcry the dehumanising humanitarianism to
which they are confined. Furthermore, they contest the old nationalist/political
space as a terrain through which scarce resources are distributed and affiliations
and loyalties are controlled and managed.
Their daily practices of survival and political negotiations highlight and
unfold the pitfalls of postcolonial nation-state formations in the region.
In this light refugees contribute to the emergence of what Partha Chatterjee
calls a “political society”. They operate through a framework of democracy
and self-determination that precede and overcome the modern Arab nation-state
project, which they represent as imbued with serious flaws. Palestinian refugees
articulate demotic narratives where discrimination, integration, rights here and
now, are integrated with a right to “return”, conceived as return to origin and
roots, land and properties, personhood, freedom. Self-determination and dignity
involve claiming simultaneously for rights to rights and right to return.
Refugees’ narratives and practices contribute to the emergence of a new
discourse and space of the “political” which, although saturated with contradic-
tions or uncertainties, parallels the disillusion with modernist political
formations and organizations across the region, and echoes the calls for dignity
that have been so central in the Arab revolts. The urge to reconcile rights
with “return” is an arena where we can see Palestinian refugees turning into a
political avant-garde, highlighting the need for new democratic state/society
configurations.
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